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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

PRESENT STATUS OF SURETYSHIP DEFENSES OF AN
ACCOMMODATION MAKER
INTRODUCTION

From 1907 until 1940 defenses common to the law of suretyship were sought to be introduced by an accommodation maker
of a negotiable instrument against the holder of the instrument
who was bringing suit upon it. Since that time, however, the practice has fallen into almost total disuse.1 The accommodation maker
has usually sought to be discharged by drawing an analogy between himself and a surety. Thus, if the holder had given a
binding extension of time to the principal debtor or had released
collateral security held by him to the principal debtor, two def ens es available to a surety, the accommodation maker requested
tu be discharged. Such requests have brought about contrary interpretations of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law. It is
the purpose of this Note to suggest reasons for the present disuse,
and to examine the influence which the Uniform Commercial Code
1 See cases collected, Annot., 48 A.L.R. 715 (1927); Annot., 65 A.L.R.
1425 (1930); Annot., 108 A.L.R. 1088 (1937); ~~nnot., 2 A.L.R.2d 260
(1948).
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now being advocated in many states would have upon the problem.2
I.

PATENT ON LATENT SURETIES

If an accommodation maker in signing the instrument places
after his name such terms as "surety," "guarantor," or "accommodation maker," he should be considered a patent surety. In
this situation, notice of the accommodation or suretyship relation
appears upon the face of the instrument. If no such term is appended to his signature, then he should be considered a latent
surety, since notice of the accommodation or suretyship relation
is not apparent from the face of the instrument. But why such a
distinction?
If an accommodation maker has appended any of the above
words to his signature, a proper interpretation of section 1923
would make such a person secondarily liable. This section provides:
The person "primarily" liable on an instrument is the person who
by the terms of the instrument is absolutely required to pay the
same. All other parties are "secondarily" liable. (Emphasis supplied).

Is not the use of the word "surety," for example, a term of the
instrument? Does not the use of this one word say, if another
signature appears thereon: "as between myself and the other
party whose signature appears upon this instrument, he is the one
who is the principal debtor and I will pay if he does not. But
if I do, he will be required to pay me"? It should be apparent
that a literal construction of this section would mean that an
accommodation maker or co-maker, placing upon the face of the
instrument the nature of his liability, as well as notice that he
is not absolutely required to pay the same as between himself and
the accommodated party, would not fall into the definition of section 192. He is not by the terms of the instrument absolutely required to pay the same. He is required to pay if the principal
debtor does not. If such an interpretation were adopted, he would
2 The Uniform Commercial Code has been passed in Pennsylvania, effective July 1, 1954. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12a §§ 1-101 to 10-104 (1954).
For actions by other states, see Schnader, Pennsylvania Leads the Way:
The First State to Enact the Uniform Commercial Code, 7 Conf. Pers. Fin.
L.Q. Rep. 72 (Summer 1952).
3 Throughout this Note the sections will be referred to as numbered in
Negotiable Instruments, 5 Uniform Laws Annotated (1943). Numbering
therein corresponds to that of the original Negotiable Instruments Act.
Numbering coincides with that used in Beutel's Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law (7th ed. 1948).
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be a party "secondarily liable," and therefore anything which
would discharge a person secondarily liable under the provisions
of section 120 would also discharge him. Although the accommdation maker may be required to pay the instrument in some instances, it is apparent from the face of the instrument that the
ultimate liability rests with the party accommodated, and it is he
alone who is absolutely required to pay the same by the terms of
the instrument.
Section 120 ( 6) provides for discharge if a binding extension
of time is given unless there is a reservation of rights against the
party secondarily liable. It was held in Cellers v. Meachem,4 one
of the leading cases denying the use of suretyship defenses, that
although an accommodation maker has added the word "surety"
to his name, he is a person "primarily liable" and not discharged
by a binding extension of time given to the accommodated party.
It is submitted that the provisions of section 192 do not require
such an interpretation. The court in the Cellers case relies upon
a text on commercial paper which stated that an accommodation
maker is absolutely liable on the instrument. 5 However, section
29 only provides that an accommodation maker is liable, and the
word "absolutely" does not appear. Absolute liability is a proper
interpretation only if the assumption is made that the accommodation party is a person primarily liable under section 192. Had
the drafters wanted to make him absolutely liable they would have
inserted such a term in section 29. Of course, the sole fact of
accommodation is not sufficient to relieve an accommodation maker
from liability. However, when notice of the suretyship relation
appears on the instrument, the surety should be held to be secondarily liable. This would be all the more true, if the term "principal debtor" as used in the act was used in the suretyship sense
as it was intended to be. 6
That a distinction should be made in those cases where the
suretyship relationship is patent, from those in which the relationship is latent, is obvious. For example, the Massachusetts
rule with reference to a binding extension of time was adopted
in a case of latent suretyship, and parol evidence was held not to
be admissible to prove the relationship.• But in a subsequent case,
although not citing the NIL, a patent surety was allowed the defense of a release of collateral because according to the tenor of
49 Ore. 186, 89 Pac. 426 (1907).
uEaton & Gilbert, Commercial Paper§§ 123(f), 550 (1903).
6 Beutel, The l\Ieaning of the Term "Principal Debtor" as used in the
Negotiable Instruments Law, 19 Penn. B.A.Q. 206, 209 (1934).
7 Union Trust Co. v. l\IcGinty, 212 Mass. 205, 98 N.E. 679 (1912).
4
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the note, the payee was charged with notice of the relationship
between the principal and the surety.8
If the accommodating party is a patent surety, either as
maker or co-maker, then he should be allowed to come under the
provisions of section 120. Although the release of collateral as
well as other suretyship defenses has been excluded from section
120, it would seem that a resort to section 196, which provides
that in any case not covered by the act, the rules of the law merchant shall govern, would yield the means for allowing the insertion of this defense,9 even though it has been held that the provisions of section 120 are exclusive.10

The same results also would be obtained under the Uniform
Commercial Code, section 3-606.11
II.

EXTENS:::ON OF Til\IE

The real problem arises when the accommodating party signs
the instrument either as maker or co-maker, 'vithout adding words
showing in what capacity he signs. In this instance he would be
deemed a latent surety. From the face of the instrument it appears that he is a co-maker, or merely the maker.
At common law an accommodation maker of a negotiable instrument who was apparently a principal but in fact a surety was
discharged if the holder with knowledge of the true relation of
the parties granted a binding extension of time to the principal
debtor.12 It was possible to show by parol that the co-maker or
indorser was the principal debtor.13 If the holder took the instrument in ignorance of the suretyship relation, but became aware
of it before granting the extension, the weight of authority supported the view that the surety, though primarily liable by the
terms of the instrument, was discharged by the binding extension
of time to the principal debtor.14
An accommodation maker, if not in fact at least in principle,
Durfee v. Kelly, 228 l\Iass. 571, 117 N.E. 907 (1917).
Beutel's Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law 1159 (7th ed. 1948).
10 Dunnington v. Bank .of Crewe, 144 Va. 36, 131 S.E. 221 (1926).
11 Uniform Commercial Code, Uniform Laws Annotated 424 (Official
Draft 1952).
12 4 Williston, Contracts § 1259 (rev. ed. 1936); Henning, The Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law, 59 U. Pa. L. Rev. 532 (1911); 3 Daniel,
Negotiable Instruments § 1511 (7th ed. 1933).
13 Lauman, Hedges & Co. v. Nichols. 15 Iowa 161 (1863); 4 Williston,
Contracts § 1259 (rev. ed. 1936); Henning, The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, 59 U. Pa. L. Rev. 532, 535 (1911).
14 Ibid. But see 3 Daniel, Negotiable Instruments§ 1537 (7th ed. 1933).
8
9
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is a surety. 15 If the obligation is one of a personal nature, the
average accommodation maker is usually a friend or relative of
the principal debtor. He usually signs the instrument because of
pressure brought to bear by the principal debtor upon the insistance of the payee.16 Similarly, much of the present day accommodation is accomplished by corporate officers and stockholders
signing to accommodate their corporation. 17 These situations suggest strongly that accommodation parties of this type should be
awarded special consideration.
A.

The Majority Rule

The so-called majority view,18 that a binding extension of
time does not discharge an accommodation maker or surety, has
been adopted initially in most jurisdictions in cases in which the
plaintiff was a payee and the fact of the suretyship relation did
not appear on the face of the instrument.19 In a lesser number of
cases it has been adopted where the plaintiff was a holder who
took with knowledge of the suretyship relation although the relationship was not apparent upon the face of the instrument.20
There is a surprising absence of cases where the plaintiff was a
holder in due course who learned of the suretyship relationship
after acquiring the instrument. It must be noted, however, that if
a jurisdiction has applied the rule to a case in which the plaintiff
was a payee or a holder with knowledge of the relationship, a
fortiori, it would also be applied to a holder in due course who
lu Raymond, Suretyship at "Law l\Ierchant," 30 Harv. L. Rev. 141, 147
(1917).
lG See Hilpert, Discharge of Latent Sureties on Negotiable Instruments
Because of Release or Extension of Time, 50 Yale L.J. 387, 403 (1941).
17 Turner, Revision of the Negotiable Instruments Law, 38 Yale L.J. 25,
49 (1928).
18 Annot., 49 A.L.R. 715
(1927); Annot., 65 A.L.R. 1325 (1930);
Annot., 108 A.L.R. 1088 (1937).
19 Cowan v. Ramsey, 15 Ariz. 533, 140 Pac. 501 (1914); Hall v. Farmers
Bank, 74 Colo. 165, 220 Pac. 237 (1923); Fox v. Terre Haute Nat. Bank,
78 Ind. App. 666, 129 N.E. 33 (1920); Citizens Bank v. Bowden, 98 Kan.
140, 157 Pac. 429 (1916); First State Bank v. Williams, 164 Ky. 143, 175
S.W. 10 ( 1915); Vanderford v. Farmers & Mechanic's Nat. Bank, 105 Md.
164, 66 Atl. 47 (1907); Vernon Center State Bank v. l\Iangelsen, 166
l\Iinn. 472, 208 N.W. 186 (1926); Richards v. l\Iarket Exch. Bank, 81
Ohio St. 348, 90 N.E. 1000 (1910); Wolstenholme v. Smith, 34 Utah 300,
97 Pac. 329 (1908); Bradley Eng. & Mfg. Co. v. Heyburn, 56 Wash. 628,
106 Pac. 170 (1910); see Clifford v. West Hartford Creamery Co., 103
Vt. 229, 153 Atl. 205 (1931); Rosendal State Bank v. Holland, 195 Wis.
131, 217 N.W. 645 (1928~.
20 Union Trust Co. v. l\IcGinty, 212 Mass. 205, 98 N.E. 679 (1912);
National Citizens Bank v. Toplitz, 81 App. Div. 593, 81 N.Y.Supp. 422
(1st Dep't 1903), aff'd, 178 N.Y. 466, 71 N.E. 1 (1903).
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learned of the relationship after acquiring the instrument. The
reasoning upon which the majority view is based is adaptable to
a situation in which the holder is a holder in due course who took
it without knowledge of the relationship, and following that reasoning there could be no other conclusion than to deny a discharge
to the aceonm1-0dation maker.
Briefly summarized, the courts which have applied the majority rule have done so on the following reasoning:
1. The surety and accommodation maker, being primarily
liable, are held to be discharged only in the methods prescribed by
section 119. Since the act does not provide for a discharge of
the instrument by an extension of time, it follows that a party
primarily liable thereon is not discharged by such e:i...'i;ension.21

2. Section 120 ( 6) provides for the discharge of a person
secondarily liable by an extension of time, but an accommodation
maker is primarily liable under the statute.22

3. The NIL makes no provision for the relation of principal
and surety.23
4. The act makes parties signing on the face of the instrument as makers, liable as such, and does not permit another or
different liability to be proved.24
5. The NIL substitutes its provisions for the former law of
the jurisdiction.25
6.

An accommodation maker is by section 29 under no dif-

21 Vanderford v. Farmers & 1Iechanic's Nat. Bank, 105 l\Id. 164, 66 Atl.
47 (1907); Cellers v. 11eachem, 49 Ore. 186, 89 Pac. 426 (1907); Wolstenholme v. Smith, 34 Utah 300, 97 Pac. 329 (1908); Richards v. l\Iarket
Exch. Bank, 81 Ohio St. 348, 90 N.E. 1000 (1910) ;. Union Trust Co. v.
McGinty, 212 l\Iass. 205, 98 N.E. 679 (1912); Cow.an v. Ramsey, 15 .Ariz.
533, 140 Pac. 501 (1914); First State Bank v. Williams, 164 Ky. 143, 175
S.W. 10 (1915); Citizens Bank v. Bowden, 98 Kan. 140, 157 Pac. 429
(1916); Hall v. Farmers Bank, 74 Colo. 165, 220 Pac. 237 (1923); .Atlantic L. Ins. Co. v. Carter, 165 Tenn. 628, 57 S.W.2d 449 (1933); l\Iortgage Guarantee Co. v. Chotiner, 8 Cal.2d 110, 64 I'.2d 138 (1936).
22 Cases cited note 21 supra.
23 Union Trust Co. v. l\.IcGinty, 212 Mass. 205, 98 N.E. 679 (1912);
Cowan v. Ramsey, 15 .Ariz. 533, 140 Pac. 501 (1914); Hall v. Farmers
Bank, 74 Colo. 165, 220 Pac. 237 (1923).
24Union Trust Co. v. l\IcGinty, 212 l\Iass. 205, 98 N.E. 679 (1912);
Cowan v. Ramsey, 15 .Ariz. 533, 140 Pac. 501 (1914); Fox v. Terre Haute
Nat. Bank, 78 Ind . .App. 666, 129 N.E. 33 (1920).
25 Cellers v. Meachem, 49 Ore. 186, 89 Pac. 426 (1907); Wolstenholme
v. Smith, 34 Utah 300, 97 Pac. 329 (1908); Union Trust Co. v. l\IcGinty,
212 Mass. 205, 98 N.E. 679 (1912).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

496

f erent liability than a maker who has received value, even though
the holder know at the time of his accommodation character.26
7.

Uniformity of decision among the jurisdictions.27

The exclusive modes of discharge provided by section 119, and
the interpretation that they do not include an extension of time,
have been severely criticized.28 The majority view rests upon the
untrue assumption that section 119 is the only section of the act
covering the discharge of instruments; whereas, section 51 provides that payment to the holder discharges the instrument, and
section 122 provides that an absolute and unconditional renunciation of rights by the holder against the principal debtor made at
or after the maturity of the instrument discharges the instrument.
It has been suggested that a discharge of a party, who though
primarily liable as a co-maker, is known to the holder to be a
surety, by giving time to the principal debtor is covered by section 119 (4) .29 This argument has been rejected in those cases
where it has been presented,30 except in South Dakota.31 The
argument has been attacked on two grounds: (1) that section 119
refers to the discharge of the instrument and not to discharge of
the parties, and (2) the restrictive effect such interpretation
would have as against a holder other than the immediate parties to
the agreement.32 If allowed under this section, the discharge
would be only a discharge of the accommodating party. The note
would still be in force, at least as to the accommodated party.
Therefore, there would not be a valid discharge of the instrument. 33
Cases cited note 23 supra.
Union Trust Co. v. McGinty, 212 l\Iass. 205, 98 N.E. 679 (1912); First
State Bank v. Williams, 164 Ky. 143, 175 S.W. 10 (1915); Fox v. Terre
Haute Nat. Bank, 78 Ind. App. 666, 129 N.E. 33 (1920).
2s Beutel's Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law 1122 (7th ed. 1948);
Greeley, The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law in the light of Recent
Criticism, 10 Ill. L. Rev. 265 (1915); Raymond, Suretyship at "Law
Merchant," 30 Harv. L. Rev. 141 (1917).
29 See note 28 supra.
30 Cowan v. Ramsey, 15 Ariz. 533, 140 Pac. 501 (1914); First State
Bank v. Williams, 164 Ky. 143, 175 S.W. 10 (1915); see Case Threshing
Mach. Co. v. Bridger, 133 La. 754, 63 So. 319 (1913).
31 Zastrow v. Knight, 56 S.D. 554, 229 N.W. 925, 72 A.L.R. 379 (1930);
Citizens State Bank v. Rosenwald, 63 S.D. 50, 256 N.W. 264 (1934).
32 Hilpert, Discharge of Latent Sureties on Negotiable Instruments Because of Release or Extension of Time, 50 Yale L.J. 387, 409 (1941).
33 See Industrial Trust Co. v. Goldman, 59 R.I. 11, 193 Atl. 852, 112
A.L.R. 1313 (1937).
26

21
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An analogy has also been drawn between an accommodation
maker and a mortgagor and maker of the negotiable note who
has conveyed the mortgaged premises to a grantee who has assumed the mortgage.34 The weight of authority is: if the mortgagee, with knowledge of the conveyance of the property and
assumption of the mortgage debt by the grantee, extends the
time of payment by a valid agreement between himself and the
grantee, such extension operates to discharge the original mortgagor, or intermediate grantee who may likewise have assumed
the mortgage. This rule applies unless such extension is assented
to by the mortgagor or intermediate grantee, or unless the rights
of the mortgagee against such parties are expressly reserved. 30 In
such cases the mortgagor is treated as a surety, and is given a
discharge.
The Rhode Island court in Indu,strial Trust Co. v. Goldman, 3 fl
based its decision on the provisions of section 119 ( 4). The court
distinguished this situation from that of an accommodation comaker because in that instance, the discharge would be only a
discharge of the accommodating party. This would leave the note
still in force, at least as to the accommodated party, and therefore, would not discharge the instrument. Most courts, however,
justify their position in various ways, but principally on the
ground that they are governed by a rule of property.37 Although
it may seem to be an inconsistency and appear in the same jurisdiction,38 the cases should be distinguished and section 119 (4)
invoked only to discharge an accommodation maker as distinguished from an accommodation co-maker, because in this instance it
does serve to validly discharge the instrument.
In the jurisdictions following the majority view, in the event
an accommodation maker was actually being harmed by an extension of time and was able to prove that the accommodated
party was actually becoming insolvent to the detriment of the acRoberts, Defenses of an Accommodation Maker, 23 Iowa L. Rev. 335,
340 (1938).
35 Industrial Trust Company v. Goldman, 59 R.I. 11, 193 Atl. 852 (1938).
See Annotation of the case at 112 A.L.R. 1324, 1327 (1938).
36 Ibid.
37 Roberts, Defenses of an Accommodation Maker, 23 Iowa L. Rev. 335
(1938); Jefferson County Bank v. Erickson, 188 l\Iinn. 354, 247 N.W.
245 (1933).
38 Compare Union Trust Co. v. l\'IcGinty, 212 l\'Iass. 205, 98 N.E. 679
(1912) with l\'Iaglione v. Penta, 266 l\'Iass. 413, 165 N.E. 424 (1929) ;
Vernon Center State Bank v. Mangelsen, 166 l\Iinn. 472, 208 N.W. 186
(1926) with Jefferson County Bank v. Erickson, 188 l\'Iinn. 354, 247 N.W.
245 (1933).
34
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commodation maker, would it be possible for him to obtain equitable exoneration by the principal, notwithstanding the extension
of time granted by the holder of the instrument? Such action
would be based on the contract between the accommodated party
and the accommodating party.39 Although the rule in suretyship
as it presently stands would be contra, since the surety is ordinarily discharged in such a situation, the court should apply the
same rules it applies when a surety is required to perform for
reasons of business compulsion. Similarly, it would seem the same
rule would apply in an action for reimbursement.40

B.

The Minority View

The minority view, that a binding extension of time does discharge either an accommodation maker or co-maker, has been applied predominantly in cases where the plaintiff is a payee.41 The
reasoning adopted by the minority has not been consistent. Some
of the reasons are as follows:
1. Where the action is between the original parties, section
58, which declares that "in the hands of any holder other than a
holder in due course, a negotiable instrument is subject to the
same defenses as if it were non-negotiable" applies, and the surety
is released by a definite extension of time upon a valid consideration.42

2.

The payee may not be a holder in due course.43

39 In Peter v. Finzer, 116 Neb. 380, 217 N.W. 612, 65 A.L.R. 1419 (1928)
Finzer, a maker, was held not to be discharged by an extension of time
given by the mortgagee to a subsequent grantee. When the mortgagee
brought the first suit in law on the note, Finzer also brought suit in
equity against subsequent grantees to compel payment to Peter by them,
but Finzer was required to pay before this suit was completed. In an
amended petition he sought payment from the subsequent grantees. Recovery was allowed. He was permitted to proceed against the principal
debtor despite a binding extension of time which had previously been held
not to discharge him. Finzer v. Peter, 120 Neb. 389, 232 N.W. 762 (1930).
40 See Restatement, Security§ 108 (1941).
41 Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Snouffer, 139 Iowa 176, 117 N.W. 50 (1908);
Newkirk v. Hays, 220 Mo. App. 514, 275 s.w. 964 (1925); Strother v.
Wilkinson, 90 Okla. 247, 216 Pac. 435 (1923); Citizens' State Bank v.
Rosenwal, 63 S.D. 50, 256 N.W. 264 (1934); J.I. Case Threshing Mach.
Co. v. Howth, 116 Tex. 434, 293 S.W. 800 (1927); Koblegard Co. v.
Maxwell, 127 W. Va. 630, 34 S.E.2d 116 (1945); see Ray v. Summerlin,
211 Ala. 434, 100 So. 482 (1924).
42Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Snouffer, 139 Iowa 176, 117 N.W. 50 (1908).
43 Newkirk v. Hays, 220 Mo. App. 514, 275 S.W. 1062 (1925); Strother
v. Wilkinson, 90 Okla. 247, 216 Pac. 436 (1923); J.I. Case Threshing
Mach. Co. v. Howth, 116 Tex. 434, 293 S.W. 800 (1927).
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3. There is a statutory variation between the NIL and the
local statute.44
4.

Section 119(4) allows for the discharge of the surety.4u

5.

Section 196 applies sub silentio.46

In any jurisdiction which has adopted the position that a
payee is not a holder in due course, suretyship defens es will be
allowed, when the action is between the immediate parties. Oddly
enough, the jurisdictions adopting this position coincide with those
jurisdictions which allow the defenses of suretyship.47 The minority view has usually been limited to cases in which the plaintiff
was a payee, and the minority view has not extended its reasoning to cover a holder in due course.48
The one case which has allowed the defense of a binding extension of time as against a holder in due course is Hederman 11.
Cox.49 Although section 196 was not cited, the case expressly
rejects the majority view, and returns to the uncodified law suggested by citation of early cases. The court reasoned that the
rules of suretyship were not abrogated by the passage of the NIL,
and that it was not the intent of the legislature to change the previously existing law. The court was fully cognizant of all the
criticism which has been leveled at the majority view. 00 This
case is the last one to be decided on the problem. The court was
unaided by a legislative change in the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law.
1

C. Statutory Variations
The change in the uniform statute which was inserted by the
legislature of Illinois has possibly prevented a clear cut decision
44 Koblegard Co. v. Maxwell, 127 W. Va. 630, 34 S.E.2d 116 (1944);
see Lawrence v. Hammond, 208 Ill. App. 31 (1917).
45 Zastrow v. Knight, 56 S.D. 554, 229 N.W. 925 .(1930); Citizens State
Bank v. Rosenwald, 63 S.D. 50, 256 N.W. 264 (1934).
46 Hederman v. Cox, 188 Miss. 21, 193 So. 19 (1940).
47 Compare cases in note 37 supra with Beutel's Branna~, Negotiable Instruments Law 682 et seq. (7th ed. 1948); Annot., 142 A.L.R. 489 (1943)
witk Annot., 48 A.L.R. 715 (1927); 65 A.L.R. 1425 (1930); 108 A.L.R.
1088 (1937).
48 Long v. Mason, 273 Mo. 266. 200 S.W. 1062 (1918); Strother v. Wilkinson, 90 Okla. 247, 216 Pac. 436 (1923).
49188 Miss. 21, 193 So. 19 (1949); 24 Minn. L. Rev. 863 (1940); 53
Harv. L. Rev. 1390 (1940); 12 Miss. L.J. 506 {1940); 88 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 874 (1940). Hederman was the maker, a latent surety, and not a
co-maker, on a note given as collateral for the note of the accommodated
party.
50 Hederman v. Cox, 188 Miss. 21, 25, 193 So. 21, 23 (1940).
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in that state.
section 120 :

It is provided in the section similar to that of

A person secondarily liable on the instrument is discharged .. .G By an agreement in favor of the principal debtor binding
upon the holder to extend the time of payment, or to postpone
the holder's right to enforce the instrument, unless made with
assent prior or subsequent of the party secondarily liable, or unless the right of recourse against such party is expressly reserved,
or unless the principal debtor be an accommodating party. (Emphasis supplied) .Gl

Wisconsin has attempted to add additional suretyship defenses
to section 120 such as release of collateral or failure to apply
funds. u2 West Virginia has gone even further, and has changed
the section which was meant to coincide with the provisions of
section 120 to provide: "This section does not include the rules
governing the discharge of a surety or party secondarily liable
because of such secondary liability." 53 An analysis of all the
cases and statutes reveals that there is a great conflict in the
interpretation of the pertinent sections of the NIL as well as
variations in the statutory provisions of the states.

D. Criticism of the Majority and Minority Views
If the doctrine of stare decisis is allowed to come into the
picture it will make re-interpretation extremely difficult, it not
impossible. It may be said of the majority view that it is somewhat consistent in its reasoning. The minority view on the other
hand is nothing but a jumbled mass, and the reasoning supporting
this view although obtaining the more desirable result is, perhaps,
less sound than the majority view. The exception is the court of
Mississippi, which has decided the question solely upon the ordinary law of suretyship. °'1 This lack of uniformity of reasoning
found in the cases supporting the minority view explains the inability of these cases to effectively form a weapon to combat the
more consistent, but less desirable, view of the majority. Similarily, the majority view presents a vast array of cases,55 which
may prevent the issue from being litigated because the sheer numerical weight seems to deny the use of these defenses. However,
the writers on the subject have uniformly reached the conclusion
that the defenses of suretyship should be allowed, although they
have disagreed on occasion with the reasoning of the minority
Ill. Ann. Stat. c .. 98, § 141(5) (1935).
G2Wis. Stat.§ 117.38(4a) (1951).
o3W. Va. Code Ann.§ 4331 (1949).
M Hederman v. Cox, 188 Miss. 21, 193 'So. 19 (1940).
m; See note 19 supra.
51
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view. 56 As indicated by subsequent legislation,57 the policy considerations seem to be in favor of allowing these defenses.
The courts adopting both views, as well as the attorneys who
presented the issues, have assumed that somewhere within the
confines of the statute the situation of the latent surety co-maker
is covered. The intended effect of the statute is strictly in the
realm of conjecture. These improper constructions of the act
might lead to only one conclusion; namely, that the situation is
not precisely, nor adequately covered by the act. Therefore, it is
an omitted case, and section 196 applies. Once the assumption
is made that such a situation is not covered by the act, it would
merely require the application of the ordinary rules of suretyship.
After once having allowed the defenses of suretyship, it would
seem wise to distinguish three important factual situations: ( 1)
As between 'the immediate parties and (2) against a holder who
took the instrument with knowledge of the relationship, it would
seem that suretyship defenses should be allowed. (3) But as
against a holder in due course who subsequently acquires the knowledge of the latent accommodation after having acquired the instrument, policy considerations dra-1,vn from the provisions of
the NIL should preclude the defenses. For example section 57
provides that the holder in due course "may enforce payment"
free from all defects of title and defenses. Sections 60, 61 and
62 provide that the original parties making, drawing and accepting the instrument undertake to pay it "according to its tenor,"
and the defense of suretyship as against him should be disallowed.
If it were otherwise, the holder in due course would be subjected
to making a complete, thorough, and accurate investigation as to
the validity of the information purporting to convey to him the
knowledge of the accommodation before proceeding upon the
instrument. Such undue burden could be obviated by merely
having the accommodation maker place notice of such accommodation on the face of the instrument. 58
Such an interpretation, however, has not met with the favor
of the courts, and with the possible exception of Mississippi it has
never been applied. It would seem that the only remedy that
56 See notes 13, 15, 16 and 28 supra; Comment, 7 Brooklyn L. Rev. 362
(1938); 42 Harv. L. Rev. 136 (1928); 19 l\Iarq. L. Rev. 122 (1935); 24
Ya. L. Rev. 569 (1938).
57 W. Va. Code Ann. § 4331 (1949); Pa. Stat. Ann. Tit. 12a § 3-606
(1954).
58 See discussion, Beutel's Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law 1124
(7th ed. 1948).
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would bring an immediate end to such conflict would be the adoption of a uniform amendment.
E.

The Uniform Commercial Code

Pennsylvania which has recently adopted the Uniform Commercial Code is in conformity with the minority view, since the
Uniform Commercial Code adopts the minority position.w Section 3-60660 provides :
(1) The holder discharges any party to the instrument to the
extent that without such party's consent the holder (a) without
express reservation of rights releases or agrees not to sue any
person against whom the party has, to the knowledge of the holder,
a right of recourse on the instrument or agrees to suspend the
right to enforce against such person the instrument or collateral . . . .

The words "any party to the instrument" removes an uncertainty
arising under section 120 of the NIL. The suretyship defens es
here provided are not limited to parties who are "secondarily
liable," but are available to any party who is in the position of a
surety, including an accommodation maker or acceptor known to
the holder to be such.61 The words "to the knowledge of the
holder" would exclude a latent surety, as for example, the accommodation maker where there is nothing on the instrument to show
that he has signed for the accommodation of another and the
holder is ignorant of that fact. In such a case~ the holder is
entitled to proceed according to what is shown by the face of the
paper or what he otherwise knows, and does not discharge the
surety when he acts in ignorance of the relation. 62 The words "a
right of recourse on the instrument" include the right of an accommodation party against the party accommodated.63
Section 3-415 ( 5) provides that an accommodation party is
not liable to the party accommodated, and if he pays the instrument he has a right of recourse on the instrument against such
party. But sub-section (5) is directed, according to the comment,61 to instances when the accommodating party is an endorser.
Gr• Pa. Stat. Ann. Tit. 12a

§ 3-606 (1954).
Uniform Commercial Code, Uniform Laws Annoted 424 (Official Draft
1952).
61 Id. § 3-606, Comment, Purposes of Changes and New Matter, para. 1,
425.
62 Id. para. 4, p. 426.
63 Id. para. 5, p. 426.
tH The comments state that an accommodation taker is to be included
in this section. If that is so, it introduces a strange new concept into
the field of negotiable instruments, in that a maker has a "right of re60
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Does the accommodating party who signs as a maker have a
right to recourse on the instrument when the accommodated party
is the payee? Or is the accommodation maker excluded in this
instance? The language "agrees to suspend the right to enforce"
is sufficient to cover both an extension of time of payment and
a COVE;!nant not to sue.IN Of course, the holder may reserve his
rights as against any party with a right of recourse, 66 but such
reservation is not effective as against any party whom the holder
does not use due diligence to notify within ten days after the
reservation.67 However, the holder must have notice of the relation at the time the instrument is taken. If the holder is a holder
in due course who subsequently acquires knowledge of the relationship after having acquired the instrument, the defense is not
available, since the accommodation may not be proved by oral
proof. Section 3-415 (3) provides:
As against a holder in due course and without notice of the
accommodation oral proof of the accommodation is not admissible
to give the accommodation party the benefit of discharges dependent on his character as such.

Under sub-section (3) except as against a holder in due course
without notice of the accommodation, parol evidence is admissible
to prove that the party has signed for accommodation/18
The wording of the statute could perhaps present a problem.
The statute specifically provides that "oral proof" of the accommodation is not admissible. Let us assume that the agreement
between the accommodated party and the accommodating party
was in the form of a written agreement. Would this be admissible to prove the accommodation? The way the statute is worded
it could not be excluded. The drafters should have used the word
"parol." In order to accomplish the desired result it would seem
that the statute should be so construed; otherwise, a written contract could be introduced to prove the accommodation. If such
proof is admissible, is the accommodation party then given the
course" against the payee. The previous theory was that recovery was to
be had on the contract of accommodation between the parties. In this instance it could be construed to mean "on account of" the instrument, rather
than merely "on" the instrument.
65 Uniform Commercial Code, Uniform Laws Annotated para. 6, p. 426
(Official Draft 1952).
66Id. § 3-606(2), p. 425.
67Id. § 3-606(3), p. 425.
as Id. § 3-415, Comment, Purposes of Changes and New Matter, para. 1,
p. 375.
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benefit of discharges dependent on his character as such? Or
was it the "legislative" intent to allow written proof of the accommodation other than what appears on the instrument itself?
The wording of the section does present an ambiguity.
The Uniform Commercial Code may be objected to on the
ground that there is no reason why latent sureties on negotiable
instruments, even as against a holder in due course, should not
be discharged by an extension of time. The defense should be
allowed since the discharge results from the holder's own act
only after he knows of the suretyship and not from his knowledge
of the relation, or previous conduct by prior parties. Such a law
in no-way aids the negotiability of the instrument.69 But should
the holder in due course be subjected to the expense and trouble
of checking the authenticity of a supposed claim of accommodation? Would not such law present a procedure of obtaining delay
before the holder acted on the instrument, or harrassing him, if
the claim were false?
It would seem at first glance that the Uniform Commercial
Code has made a change in the law as it existed under the NIL.
Such change would be detrimental to lending institutions, who
are primarily interested in this aspect of commercial paper. It
will, however, present little difficulty to any lender who knows
the law, since all that is required is a provision in the instrument
expressly waiving the e:i..1:ension of time as a defense. Because
of their superior bargaining position, individual lenders or lending
institutions will have little difficulty in attaining assent to such a
waiver clause. The drafters of the code are in conformity with
this position. 70
III.

RELEASE OF COLLATERAL

Prior to the adoption of the NIL the release or surrender of
collateral security held by the creditor and applicable to the pay-

69 See Hilpert, Discharge of Latent Sureties On Negotiable Instruments
Because of Release or Extension of Time, 50 Yale L ..J. 387, 514 (1941);
Roberts, Defenses of an Accommodation Maker, 23 Iowa L. Rev. 335, 350
(1938).
70 Uniform Commercial Code, Uniform Laws Annotated § 3-606, Comment, Purposes of Changes and New Matter, para. 3, p. 425 (1952) provides:
Assent may be given in advance, and is commonly incorporated in the
instrument; or it may be given afterward. It requires no consideration,
and operates as a waiver of the assenting party's right to claim his own
discharge.

NOTES

505

ment of the note operated as a pro tanto discharge of an accommodation maker or surety. 71

A.

UnCler the Negotiable Instrurnents Law

The provisions of the NIL defining the persons primarily and
secondarily liahle, 72 and those stating the conditions under which
an instrument and a person secondarily liable are discharged, 73
have served as the basis for denying discharge to an accommodation maker where the holder has released collateral or security
and the plaintiffs were payees.74 If applicable to a payee, it must
also be applicable to a holder in due course. The reasoning for
a denial of discharge is identical with that applied in those cases
denying discharge because of a binding extension of time.
Perhaps, in number of decisions, discharge has been given to
an accommodation maker because of release of collateral in more
cases than it has been denied. 75 The cases which have granted
the discharge have done so on the reasoning that a payee may not
be a holder in due course, 76 therefore, section 58 applies. In the
decided cases the plaintiff has been a payee.77 Similarly, in the
case of Goodrnan v. Goodman, 78 the court in applying section 119
(4) concluded that the holder was not a holder in due course, and
that acts of the payee had discharged the contract. The plaintiff
in this case had purchased the instrument after it was due.
113 Daniel, Negotiable Instruments §§ 1510, 1548 (7th ed. 1933).
72 Negotiable Instruments Law § 192.
73 Id. §§ 119 and 120.
74 German American State Bank v. Watson, 99 Kan. 686, 163 Pac. 637
(1917); Merchants Nat. Bank v. Smith, 59 Mont. 280, 196 Pac. 523, 15
A.L.R. 430 (1921); Elkhorn Production Credit Ass'n v. Johnson, 251 Wis.
280, 29 N.W.2d 64, 2 A.L.R.2d 256 (1947); see Young v. Carr, 44 Ariz.
223, 36 P.2d. 555 (1934)
75 See Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d 260 (1948).
76 The reasoning is that section 52 assumes that the holder must have
had the instrument negotiated to him, and section 30 provides that if
payable to order, it is negotiated by the indorsement of the holder completed by delivery, while the payee, not receiving the note in this manner.
is not a holder in due course. For explanation see Beutel's Brannan,
Negotiable Instruments Law 675 (7th ed. 1948); Annot., 142 A.L.R. 489
(1943).
11 Kennedy v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 47 Ga. App. 104, 169 S.E.
(1935); Southern Nat'I Life Realty Corp. v. People's Bank, 178 Ky. 80,
198 S.W. 543 (1917); First Nat'I Bank v. Goodwin, 173 Okla. 169, 47
P.2d 116 (1935); Long v. Mason, 273 l\Io. 266, 200 S.W. 1062 (1918);
Scandinavian American Bank v. Westby, 41 N.D. 276, 172 N.W. 665
(1918); see Durfee v. Kelley, 228 Mass. 571, 117 N.E. 907 (1917) (not
a latent surety); Bancroft v. Granite Sav. Bank & T. Co., 114 Vt. 336, 44
A.2d 542 (1945) (misapplication of collateral funds).
78127 Ohio St. 223, 187 N.E. 777 (1933).
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However, such r~soning does not apply to a holder in due
course when he brings the the action against the accommodation
maker. A recent case in Louisiana discharged an accommodation
maker as against a holder in due course, but the NIL was not mentioned.w This case may be explained by a provision of the Louisiana Statutes which provides :
The surety is discharged when by the act of the creditor, the
subrogation to his rights, mortgages, and privileges can no
longer be operated in favor of the surety.so

The discharge of sureties as parties primarily liable is nowhere expressly provided for, but neither is it anywhere expressly
denied. It is argued, therefore, that it is an omitted case and section 196 applies.81 Such interpretation has little, if any, support
in the cases.82

B.

The Uniform, Commercial Code

Under the Pennsylvania Statutes and under the prov1s10ns
of the Uniform Commercial Code discharge because of release of
collateral has been adopted. The pertinent section provides:
( 1) The holder discharges any party to the instrument to
the extent that without such party's consent the holder . . . (c)
unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the instrument given by
or on behalf of the party or any person against whom he has a
right of recourse.Sa

The general provision of section 3-606, are also applicable to the
defense of a release of collateral to the accommodated party.M
This section applies also to an accommodation maker. 85 Partial
release or other partial discharge, or partial extension, or any
impafrment of security, operates as a discharge pro tanto of the
party having a right of recourse. 86 Section 9-207 covers unjustifiable dealings. The comment referring to this section states
that it is new and that this defense has been generally recognized
w Glass v. McLendon, 66 So.2d 369 (La. App. 1953).
1:10 La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3061 (West 1952).
81 Beutel's Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law 1122 (7th ed. 1948);
Street, Effect of the Negotiable Instruments Law on Liability of the Surety,
11 Law Notes 105 (1907).
s2 Hilpert, Discharge of Latent Sureties on Negotiable Instruments Because of Release or Extension of Time, 50 Yale L.J. 387, 403 (1941).
83 Uniform Commercial Code, Uniform Laws Annotated § 3-6-06(1) (c)
(Official Draft 1952).
84 See Text p. 16.
85 Id. Comment, Purposes of Changes and New Matter, para. 1, p. 425.
so Id. para. 2, p. 425.
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as available to accommodation parties.87 However, such defense
is not available as against a holder in due course who had no
notice of the relation at the time he acquired the instrument,
even though he had knowledge of the relation when he released
the collateral. 88
The provisions of this section, however, may not be so easily
waived in advance. Any person having such a stipulation explained to him would probably reject it and refuse to assent to
it. Such objection, however, is not important as a practical matter,
since it would generally seem undesirable to release collateral and
thereby reduce the security of the instrument.
CONCLUSION

If the fact that an accommodation maker or co-maker is a
surety is apparent from the face of the instrument, a proper interpretation of section 192 would make such a maker secondarily
liable, and therefore within the provisions of section 120, so that
a binding extension of time to the accommodated party would
discharge either a maker or co-maker. Similarly a release of collateral to the accommodated party would be a pro tanto discharge
of either a maker or co-maker.

However, if notice of the fact of accommodation is not apparent, then either the accommodation maker of co-maker should
be considered as a latent surety. If the accommodation party
is a maker as distinguished from a co-maker, then the provisions
of section 119(4) should be applied to discharge the maker if
a binding extension of time has been given to the accommodated
party, or to discharge, pro tanto, the maker if a release of collateral has been made to the accommodated party, except as against
a holder in due course who takes without knowledge of the accommodation. If the accommodation party is a co-maker as distinguished from a maker, then the provisions of section 196 should
be invoked to discharge the co-maker if a binding exi:ension of
time has been given to the accommodated party, or to discharge,
pro tanto, the co-maker if a release of collateral has been made
to the accommodated party. The allowance of such defenses should
be limited to holders who take without knowledge of the accomodation.
If the fact of accommodation is latent, that is, the accomoda87 Id. para. 8, p. 426.
88 Id. § 3-41·5 (3) p.

375. Whether or not written proof could be introduced, and if admissible, what effect it will have, is dependent on the
construction of the statute.
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tion does not appear on the face of the instrument, then suretyship defens es should be limited to those holders who take with
knowledge of the accomodation. Suretyship defenses should not
be allowed against a holder in due course who subsequently learns
of the accommodation since a contra result would subject a holder
in due course to unnecessary harrassment, interference or expense in dealing with the instrument.
So construed and applied the Uniform Negotible Instruments
Act could obtain the same results as would be obtained under
the Uniform Commercial Code and would conform to the better
and more equitable view that suretyship defenses should be allowed in most instances.
Bob Baumfalk, '56

